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ABSTRACT 
When judges decide trademark cases, they often must balance 
trademark rights against interests in free expression. The defense known 
as “classic” or “descriptive” fair use embraces the foundational themes 
that make trademark conflicts so compelling. By design, the defense pits 
fair competition and free speech against a mark owner’s right to control 
its story, reputation, and values. The outcome of this tug of war may be 
hard to predict. It turns on consumer perception, and therefore, generally 
raises questions of fact. But in Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., this fact 
intensive question was decided as a matter of law. The intensely 
competitive business of pet products sets the stage for the expressive 
* Deborah R. Gerhardt is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina. Before
beginning my academic career, I had the honor of working with Tim Fraelich and our mentor, Robert 
P. Ducatman, at Jones Day in Cleveland, Ohio. I am grateful to Ryan Holte, the participants of the 
2018 University of Akron IP Scholars Forum and to Chandler N. Martin and Sarah Jane Francoise 
Anderson for excellent research assistance. I am also grateful to Tim Fraelich and Angela Gott for 
taking the time to speak with me and guest lecture in my 2017 UNC School of Law trademark class 
about the Pill Pockets/pillpouches litigation. And I am grateful to Bryan McGann for developing the 
Pill Pockets treat which made the last months of our beloved Kelev’s life much more comfortable. 
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battle. Mars, Inc. had been using the trademark “Pill Pockets” on a 
patented treat for hiding and delivering medicine to pets.  When the 
patents expired, The J.M. Smucker Company entered the market with 
“pillpouches.” Mars sued for trademark infringement, and Smucker held 
up the shield of descriptive fair use. This defense enumerates three factors 
designed to help courts weigh the interests of consumers, competitors, and 
mark owners. The Court granted summary judgment for the Defendant.  A 
close study of the strategic choices leading to the decision reveals the 
critical importance of articulating the difference between the first two 
elements, descriptive and trademark use of a term. They are not mutually 
exclusive opposites. Understanding the particular trademark meaning of 
bad faith, the third element, is necessary in order to select the best 
evidence to support it. Winning such a fact intensive issue on summary 
judgment is not easy. Perhaps in this case, a win could have been averted. 
This Article offers a master class on descriptive fair use by examining the 
parties’ litigation strategies and how they influenced the Court’s decision. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co.1 decision from the Eastern 
District of Virginia provides a master class in trademark’s expressive safe 
harbor known as “classic” or “descriptive” fair use. Judges deciding 
trademark cases must often balance trademark rights against expressive 
interests. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution may tempt us 
into thinking that First Amendment expressive freedoms will always 
trump statutory or common law trademark rights. But that is not always 
the case. All of trademark law functions as an exception to free speech by 
reserving some expressive uses exclusively for trademark owners. 
Trademark fair use doctrine involves careful balancing of a mark owner’s 
right to protect its reputation against the rights of competitors to compete 
fairly and effectively so that consumers will have access to accurate, 
informative speech that is not bounded by monopolies on descriptive 
words. 
Trademark litigation revolves around consumer perceptions which 
often present complex questions of fact. Consequently, it is not easy to 
win trademark cases on summary judgment. But they are winnable, and 
the pitched battle between Mars and Smucker over the name of a pet treat 
shows how it can be done. This article gives a master class in the 
1. No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017). (Hereinafter, 
Mars, Inc. is referred to as “Mars” and The J.M. Smucker Company is referred to as “Smucker”). 
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descriptive fair use defense by analyzing the litigation strategies that led 
to the Court’s decision. The master class proceeds in three parts. Part I 
tells the Pill Pockets story. Part II explains how the descriptive fair use 
defense works to support the foundational trademark principals of fair 
competition. Part III illustrates how descriptive fair use can be used to 
achieve victory on summary judgment and summarizes what the Pill 
Pockets story teaches about trademark selection and the descriptive fair 
use defense. 
II. THE PILL POCKETS STORY
The conflict in Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co. involved the words 
used to describe treats that surround medicine to make it more palatable 
for pets. The story of the Mars product began like many entrepreneurial 
successes—with an everyday crisis. Bryan McGann’s golden retriever 
needed medicine and would not swallow it.2 Bryan could get a pill in his 
dog’s mouth if he delivered it in cheese, but his dog found creative ways 
to eat the cheese but not the medicine.3 This issue was far from unique. In 
the late ‘90s, pet pill ingestion rates were a common problem. In trying to 
find a solution, McGann learned that trying to trick his dog with food 
wrapped around the medicine did not work because his dog could smell 
the pill after he handled it with his fingers and then touched the 
surrounding food.4 This insight was the secret to his entrepreneurial 
breakthrough.5 McGann realized that if he formed a dog treat into a pocket 
before touching the medicine, he could place the pill in the treat with one 
hand and shut the treat around the medicine with the other.6 The pill would 
be wholly encased, and the treat (untouched on the outside by the 
medicine) would not smell like the pill.7 He found that with this process, 
pets were much more likely to consume both the treat and the medicine. 
The pocket shape was the secret to the treat’s success. 
Like many entrepreneurial stories, this one had its share of delays 
and obstacles. McGann sought patent counsel and found that the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) had issued a patent in 
1989 to Robert Harold for “a food product for administering medication 
2. See Pete McEntegart, Head of Duke Startup Ventures Clinic Has Worn Many Hats, 
GREPBEAT: TRIANGLE TECH NEWS (Sep. 4, 2018), https://grepbeat.com/2018/09/04/duke-startup-
ventures-clinic-head-has-worn-many-hats/ [https://perma.cc/S3R2-QDT9]. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
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to animals.”8 Harold’s patent used the words “pill pockets” to describe the 
invention.9 The patent did not encompass all of McGann’s discoveries, 
but it was close enough to potentially block him from proceeding.10 
Undeterred, McGann contacted Robert Harold and learned he had been in 
an accident and had not been able to devote resources to commercializing 
his invention.11 They cut a deal, and McGann purchased the patent 
rights.12 Then McGann was accepted to law school, and his patent sat in 
a drawer for three years.13  
In 2000, Linda Hayden, the holder of another related patent,14 
applied to register the words “pill pocket” as a trademark for an 
“[i]ngestible pouch sold empty for use in encapsulating and aiding in the 
oral administration of medications and vitamins.”15 The original 
trademark application was filed based on her intent to use the mark in 
commerce.16 McGann joined forces with Linda Hayden in late 2001 after 
she introduced him to investors in Colorado who agreed to fund 
commercialization of their venture.17 On September 20, 2002, Hayden 
sent the USPTO a statement alleging use of the “Pill Pockets” mark in 
commerce, and in 2003, she assigned the mark to Pill Pockets, Inc., the 
company she formed with McGann.18  
Pill Pockets were a huge success. In 2005, S&M NuTec, the 
developer and owner of the Greenies pet product brand, acquired Pill 
Pockets Inc.,19 and in 2006, Mars acquired S&M NuTec, becoming the 
owner of both the Greenies and Pill Pockets brands.20 
After the patents expired, the product continued to be a commercial 
success. The door to competition was open and compelling. In August 
2016, Smucker—the owner of the Milk Bone dog biscuit brand—
8. U.S. Patent No. 4,857,333 (filed May 12, 1988)(“The treat may be provided in a variety of 
shapes and sizes as long as the treats are chewable and include pill pockets.”)(emphasis added). 
9. U.S. Patent No. 4,857,33 at col. 2 11. 42-55 (filed May 12, 1988). 
10. See id. 
11. See McEntegart, supra note 2. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. U.S. Patent No. 6,143,316 (filed September 6, 1996). 
15. PILL POCKETS, Registration No. 2,673,252. 
16. See id. (application filing date: Nov. 06, 2000, registration date: Jan. 07, 2003). 
17. Email from Bryan McGann to Deborah Gerhardt (Feb. 2, 2019) (on file with author).
18. Id. 
19. Developer of Greenies Acquires Healthy Pet Treat for Pill Delivery, BUS. WIRE (Apr. 18, 
2005, 09:00 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20050418005070/en/Developer-
Greenies-Acquires-Healthy-Pet-Treat-Pill [https://perma.cc/S6HN-B9FX]. 
20. See Mars to Buy Greenies’ Maker S&M NuTec, PET PRODUCT NEWS (Sep. 19, 2006, 03:47 
PM), http://www.petproductnews.com/September-2006/Mars-To-Buy-Greenies-Maker-S-M-
NuTec/ [https://perma.cc/RR3T-5Y8Y]. 
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bulldozed through it. They began selling a competitive product called 
“pillpouches.”21 Examples of the product packaging used by both 
companies appear below: 
Mars decided that the product names were so similar that consumers 
would be confused, and it sued Smucker for trademark infringement.22 
The resolution of the dispute provides a model for understanding and 
strategically working with trademark law’s descriptive fair use defense. 
II. THE DESCRIPTIVE FAIR USE DEFENSE
The Lanham Act was enacted to promote fair competition, and 
therefore, does not create unbounded monopolies.23 Because trademark 
protection creates a zone of exclusivity, Congress limited protections for 
words that competitors may need to name or describe their products and 
services.24 One of the important protections available to new market 
players is the descriptive fair use defense. The defense originates in 
foundational trademark principles. For a trademark to be protected under 
the Lanham Act, it must be “distinctive,” meaning that it must signal to 
consumers that the product or service comes from a particular company, 
21. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Mars, Inc.
v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017), EFC No.
25. 
22. See Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *1 (E.D. 
Va. Sept. 27, 2017). 
23. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom. U.S. 
Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990). 
24. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The 
fair use doctrine is based on the principle that no one should be able to appropriate descriptive 
language through trademark registration.”). 
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even if consumers cannot name that company.25 If a product name is 
generic, it will fail the distinctiveness test and cannot be protected as a 
mark because it is incapable of signaling to a consumer that the product 
comes from a particular source. 
The Lanham Act prohibits the registration of generic terms. Generic 
words may not be registered as trademarks because they communicate 
what a product is, not who sells it.26 If a product name becomes generic 
after it is registered, federal law also provides cancellation procedures that 
can be used to undo these registrations.27 The question of a whether a term 
is generic depends on the context in which it is used.28 If a product name 
answers the question “What are you?,” the name is generic and may not 
be protected as a mark.29 For example, “apple” is generic for the fruit and 
cannot be monopolized by any apple orchard. Trademark law protects 
competition by prohibiting any one orchard from obtaining exclusive 
rights in this word which all of them need. If, however, the product name 
answers the question “Who are you?” or “Who vouches for you?” the 
name can be distinctive and may be protected as a trademark.30 While 
“apple” may not be a mark for apples, it can be registered for computers, 
because other sellers of computers do not need to use the word “apple” to 
describe or name their goods.  
Creators of new unique products must be careful that their product 
names do not become known as generic synonyms for the products. The 
meaning of a term and its ability to send a distinctive trademark signal 
may change over time as consumer perceptions evolve. Product names 
that were once federally registered trademarks but are now considered 
generic and available to competitors include: yo-yo, aspirin, escalator, and 
trampoline.31 
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012). 
26. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“[T]he name of the product or service itself—what [the product] is, and as such . . . the 
very antithesis of a mark.”). 
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012). 
28. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[A] term 
that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for another.”). 
29. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc., 198 F.3d at 1147.
30. Id. 
31. See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 668 (7th Cir. 1965)
(holding that “yo-yo” is no longer a valid trademark); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 515–
16 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (allowing competitor to market its drug to the public under the term Aspirin since 
the word had already entered into public domain); Commissioner of Patents, Haughton Elevator Co. 
v. Seeberger, etc., 40 TRADEMARK REP. 326, 326–27 (1950) (cancelling 50-year-old registration for 
Escalator); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am. Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 755–56 (S.D. Iowa 
1961) (holding that the term Trampoline is “generic and in the public domain and cannot be 
exclusively appropriated for trademark usage”). 
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The Lanham Act also limits trademark rights in descriptive terms.32 
In addition to being more difficult to obtain, these trademarks are more 
difficult to enforce. The Act poses a high burden when an applicant seeks 
to register a descriptive mark in order to avoid unfair monopolies on 
words that competitors need to define their products and services. A mark 
will be deemed descriptive if it “conveys an immediate idea of the 
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.”33 In trademark law, 
a word or design may be classified as descriptive if it references any 
feature of the claimed goods and services, such as an ingredient, flavor, 
quality, characteristic, function, purpose, or use of the specified goods or 
services.34 A mark need not name the product or even a visual feature to 
be deemed descriptive. For example, the USPTO found that “apple pie” 
was descriptive of potpourri that was designed to smell like apple pie.35 
Because the term described the product’s purpose—to emit the scent of 
apple pie—the mark was deemed merely descriptive and unregistrable.36 
Marks that fall into this category are weaker than other marks. When a 
mark incorporates a descriptive term, the USPTO generally requires an 
applicant to disclaim any exclusive right in the descriptive word. An 
applicant who registered “Apple Twister” for a sweet apple treat was first 
required to state that it did not claim any exclusive right to the word 
“apple.”37 
The Lanham Act permits registration of descriptive marks only if the 
applicant provides evidence that although the words are descriptive, they 
still signal that the applicant is the source.38 Exclusive use of the 
descriptive words for five years may be sufficient proof.39 Federal 
trademark applications composed entirely of descriptive terms are 
generally denied registration unless the applicant submits evidence of 
acquired distinctiveness, also known as secondary meaning.40 An 
application to register “Crispy Apple Fries” for dried apples was denied 
because the mark “merely describes a feature and ingredient of applicant’s 
goods” and the applicant did not submit evidence that consumers 
32. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976). 
33. Id. at 11 (quoting Stix Prods. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
34. See In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
35. Id. at 1216–17. 
36. Id. at 1218. 
37. APPLE TWISTER, Registration No. 4,432,856 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012). 
39. Id. § 1052(f). 
40. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.1 
(4th ed. 2017). 
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perceived the mark as a source identifier.41 A mark that fails to qualify for 
the Principal Register may be placed on the less desirable Supplemental 
Register.42 When an applicant cannot establish that its mark is inherently 
distinctive, the mark may still obtain a place on the Supplemental 
Register.43 If the mark ever acquires secondary meaning, the applicant 
may reapply to register the term.44  
Once the applicant demonstrates that consumers consider the 
descriptive mark to be distinctive, the mark may be moved to the Principal 
Register. Owners of registered marks may assert trademark infringement 
claims if a competitor uses the mark in a way that causes confusion about 
the source, sponsorship, or affiliation between the mark owner and the 
new entrant.45 A parallel provision in the Lanham Act permits trademark 
infringement claims to be asserted even for descriptive marks that have 
not been federally registered if the mark owner can prove the term is 
commercially distinctive.46 
Trademark law provides several fair use defenses for protecting 
businesses that use words which others have registered as trademarks. The 
nominative fair use defense protects those who use another’s trademark 
to refer to the trademark owner or its products.47 This defense would 
protect a teacher that provides lessons on how to use Apple software, as 
long as she used Apple’s marks only to describe her services and not in a 
way that falsely suggests sponsorship or an affiliation with the company. 
The descriptive fair use defense applies in a different context, where 
the junior user is using a descriptive word to explain its own product rather 
than referring to the senior user. It shields competitors from liability when 
they use descriptive words in good faith to explain their own product 
features, even if those same descriptive words have been claimed by a 
competitor as a trademark.48 Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act created 
this safe harbor from infringement liability when words or symbols are 
used “otherwise than as a mark, . . . [as] a term or device which is 
41. Office Action, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 87/124,023 (filed Aug. 2, 2016). 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (2012). 
43. Id. § 1095. 
44. See id. 
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2012).
46. See id. § 1125(a).
47. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005);
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
48. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 197–98 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub 
nom. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The purpose of the defense is to 
prevent the trademark rights of one party from being extended to preclude another party from the 
description of his product to the public.”). 
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descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods 
or services of such party[.]”49 
Given the Lanham Act’s recognition of the descriptive fair use 
defense, any business that chooses descriptive words for its mark must 
accept the foreseeable market consequences. The words in descriptive 
marks always remain vulnerable to competitive uses. Therefore, 
descriptive marks are incapable of having a protectable and unique space 
in a competitive field. By choosing a descriptive mark, a brand owner 
assumes the risk that its words may be used by its competitors. McCarthy 
explains this risk as follows: 
By choosing a descriptive term, the trademark owner must live with the 
result that everyone else in the marketplace remains free to use the term 
in its original “primary” or descriptive sense. A junior user is always 
entitled to use a descriptive term in good faith in its primary, descriptive 
sense other than as a trademark. The only right of exclusion that trade-
mark law creates in a descriptive word is in the secondary, new, “trade-
mark” meaning of the word that plaintiff has created. The original, de-
scriptive primary meaning is always available for use by others to 
describe their goods, in the interest of free competition.50 
Given the defense, the burden of protecting descriptive marks is 
higher than it would be for a more distinctive term. Even if a mark owner 
proves that a new entrant’s use is confusing, the expressive fair use 
defense may protect the use. As the Supreme Court explained in KP 
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, “the common law of 
unfair competition also tolerated some degree of confusion from 
a descriptive use of words contained in another person’s trademark.”51 
Tolerating some confusing uses is the price an applicant must pay for 
choosing a descriptive term as a mark. “When the plaintiff chooses a mark 
with descriptive qualities, the fair use doctrine recognizes that ‘he cannot 
altogether exclude some kinds of competing uses,’ particularly those 
which use words in their primary descriptive and non-trademark sense.”52 
While descriptive marks send both descriptive and source-signifying 
messages, a new entrant charged with infringement must demonstrate its 
use is only descriptive. 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012).
50. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
11.45 (5th ed. 2018). 
51. 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004). 
52. U.S. Shoe, 740 F. Supp. at 198 (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12 (2d Cir.1976)). 
9
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The descriptive fair use defense permits mark owners to protect the 
secondary brand meaning they created while still permitting everyone else 
to use the same words for their original descriptive meaning.53 Trademark 
infringement matters can play out differently when brought by owners of 
descriptive marks. In these cases, courts often tolerate more confusion, 
because the senior user’s trademark interests are balance against the 
competitor’s expressive interest in truthfully describing its product to 
consumers. 
III. STRATEGIC LESSONS ON EACH DESCRIPTIVE FAIR USE ELEMENT
Descriptive fair use is an affirmative defense that trademark 
defendants may use to shield themselves from infringement liability. To 
gain its protection, a junior user must establish three elements: that it used 
the contested words “(1) other than as a mark, (2) in a descriptive sense, 
and (3) in good faith.”54 This section examines each of these three 
elements separately to illustrate strategic lessons that may be drawn from 
Smucker’s effective use of this defense and Mars’ failure to defeat it.  
A. Descriptive Use 
In asserting a descriptive fair use defense, a junior user must prove it 
is using its mark descriptively but not as a mark. Determining the 
difference between trademark and descriptive use can be tricky. In order 
to analyze the defense correctly, one must be careful to distinguish the 
first two prongs of the test and not to conflate them into one. Trademark 
use occurs when a symbol reflects a product’s source or origin.55 
Descriptive use occurs when one uses a term that describes the product’s 
“qualities, ingredients or characteristics”56 or an action the alleged 
infringer hopes consumers will make”57with the product While the senior 
user’s mark may both describe the product and indicate source, the junior 
user’s fair use defense depends on the ability to prove that the use is 
53. Id. at 199 (“A user of a descriptive word may acquire the exclusive right to use that 
descriptive word as an identifier of the product or source. This, however, does not justify barring 
others from using the words in good faith for descriptive purposes pertinent to their products.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
54. Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 303 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting JA Apparel Corp. v.
Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
55. Dessert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 
333 (2d Cir. 2009). 
56. In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551 (C.C.P.A. 1968). 
57. Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (quoting EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday,
Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
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descriptive but not a trademark use that signals source. Therefore, in 
assessing descriptive fair use, it is important to keep in mind that 
descriptive use and trademark use can coexist, but if a defendant engages 
in both uses, it will not be able to take advantage of the defense.58 
For the first element of the descriptive fair use test, a finding that the 
defendant engaged in descriptive use of the contested term is a necessary 
prerequisite. Descriptive fair use may be predicated on any use that 
proclaims a product feature. Courts examine this question contextually by 
considering the meaning of the word, how it relates to the particular 
product or service, and whether it is used descriptively. Although courts 
have attempted to develop heuristics to answer this question, there are no 
litmus tests. However, there are some factors that may impact a finding of 
descriptiveness. 
The typicality of a phrase may suggest descriptiveness. When a 
cosmetics company used the words “Seal it with a Kiss” in a promotional 
activity instructing consumers to seal a complimentary postcard with a 
kiss using its lipstick,59 the Court held that use of this common phrase was 
descriptive because it was used to “describe an action that the sellers hope 
consumers will take, using their product.”60 The common use of the 
phrase in this context was a factor the Court weighed in favor of 
descriptiveness. 
Use of a visually prominent and well known house mark sometimes 
suggests that consumers would consider smaller less noticeable text to be 
used descriptively.61 In U.S. Shoe v. Brown and Dessert Beauty v. Fox, the 
courts indicated that the use of more prominent and famous house marks 
would lead consumers to perceive the challenged words as descriptive62 
The use of the word “inhibitor” (a competitor’s mark) in connection with 
58. Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A]s McCarthy makes clear,
the use of a term by other sellers of similar goods is an indicia of the descriptiveness of the term, not 
of its being used in a non-trademark manner.” (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 40 § 11.20)). 
59. Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d
Cir. 1997). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 30–31. See Schafer Co. v. Innco Mgmt. Corp., 995 F.2d 1064 (4th Cir.
1993), aff’g 797 F. Supp. 477 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (granting defendant summary judgment based on the 
conclusion that defendant’s use was descriptive fair use because the use reflected a descriptive 
meaning that preexisted the plaintiff’s trademark, the term did not resemble plaintiff’s visual depiction 
of its trademark, and defendant prominently displayed its own tradename and logo in connection with 
the challenged term). 
62. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom. U.S. 
Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The ad includes the NaturalSport logo, the 
slogan, Walk Our Way and the words From Naturalizer, which defendant uses to advertise other 
styles of shoe in the NaturalSport line.”); see Dessert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 333 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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its WD-40 mark was insulated from liability based on descriptive fair 
use.63 The Court noted that “inhibitor” described a product feature and the 
packaging displayed the well-known WD-40 mark in larger more 
prominent typeface.64 
Mars’s counsel might have earned some credibility with the Court by 
conceding that the term “pillpouches” is descriptive of the defendant’s 
product. As noted above, descriptiveness can be predicated on a product’s 
purpose or function, and Smucker’s product was intended to be used to 
form a pouch to hold a pill. Mars would not concede even this element. 
Instead, Mars argued dodged the question by contending that 
“pillpouches” was misdescriptive because the Smucker’s product comes 
out of the bag as a tube and must be formed into a pouch after a consumer 
takes it from the package.65 Unlike Mars’s Pill Pockets, Smucker’s 
product must be pinched at both ends.66 The argument was a good one, 
(and will be revisited in discussing the third fair use prong), but it was not 
effective here given trademark doctrine’s broad view of descriptiveness.  
Ultimately, a consumer would pinch one end of the Smucker’s treat to 
form a pouch. Based on loads of precedent, one might easily conclude that 
pill pouches described a purpose for which Smucker’s intended 
consumers to use its product. Given this precedent, Mars’ strategy on this 
element was not well conceived. Its conception of descriptiveness failed 
to embrace the idea that a product may be descriptive it if identifies the 
purpose for using a product. 
The District Court found Smucker’s use of “pillpouches” to be 
descriptive, noting that it “alludes to that term’s primary meaning to 
describe the product’s . . . function.”67 The misdescriptive argument was 
not a winning strategy, partly because Mars and its predecessors in interest 
had used both “pill” and “pouch” to describe their product. The Harold 
patent referred to a “pill” pockets for delivering medicine.68 The Pill 
Pockets trademark application used the words “pill pouches” as a generic 
synonym in its description of goods and services.69 And as illustrated 
63. Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 724 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Due to the word’s small size, 
plain color, and non-privileged placement on the bottle, we find that ‘inhibitor’ is not an ‘attention-
getting symbol,’ and does not function as a source indicator.”). 
64. See id. 
65. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 25-26, Mars, Inc. v.
J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017), EFC No. 27. 
66. See id. 
67. Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 27, 2017). 
68. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,143,316 at col. 2 l. 4 (filed Sept. 6, 1996). 
69. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78/034,057 (filed Nov. 6, 2000) (describing the
goods as an “ingestible pouch”). 
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below, Mars’s Pill Pockets packaging uses both the words “pill” and 
“pouch” to describe features of its own product.70 
Mars had also approved the use of “pill pouches” as a generic synonym. 
When a trademark applicant described its Champion Treats product as a 
“pill pocket” in a trademark application, Mars objected, but dropped its 
opposition when the applicant changed the description of its product to a 
“pill pouch.”71 Based on this history, a competitor trying to select a 
generic synonym for the “pill pocket” may have (and in this case did) 
settle on using “pill pouches.” Given that Mars’s own packaging used 
these words descriptively, it had to strike the Court as a bit odd that it was 
arguing that the same words misdescribed a competitor’s product that was 
used for the very same purpose. 
Smucker’s lawyers effectively directed the Court’s attention to all of 
this substantial evidence of descriptive use. The Court was so impressed 
by these assertions that it seemed to conclude that the high level of 
descriptiveness was enough to establish the defense.72 The Court 
concluded: 
Smucker’s use of the term ‘pill pouches’ alludes to that term’s primary 
meaning to describe the product’s design, function, and characteristics; 
the visual appearances of Smucker’s Pill Pouches label and 
Mars’s Pill Pockets mark are dissimilar; and Smucker’s product promi-
nently displays the MILK–BONE name and logo to avoid consumer 
70. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9–10, Mars,
Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017), EFC 
No. 25. 
71. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/828,963 (filed Nov. 23, 2015) (CHAMPION
TREATS and design).  
72. Mars, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3. 
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confusion as to origin.73 
Instead of arguing that the Smucker’s mark was misdescriptive, Mars 
could have argued that even if the Court found the mark to be descriptive, 
that did not preclude a finding that the product name was being used as a 
mark. Mars could have conceded the first factor, and focused the Court’s 
attention on the second two elements of the descriptive fair use defense. 
Mars failed to convince the Court that descriptive use and use as a mark 
are not mutually exclusive. These concepts are not and should not be 
thought of as “two sides of the same coin.”74 Sometimes they coexist.75 
Sometimes they do not. All descriptive use cases involve at least one 
mark—the plaintiff’s—that is both descriptive and used as a mark. Most 
often, if the products are competitive and plaintiff’s use is descriptive, 
defendant’s use will be descriptive too. That the defendant’s use is 
descriptive should not be deemed dispositive. It is important to conduct a 
separate analysis of the first two descriptive fair use elements, because the 
even if a term is found to be descriptive, it may fail the second element if 
it also used as a mark. Perhaps Mars’s biggest strategic error was that it 
failed to illuminate that distinction. 
B. Use as a Mark 
The second element requires analysis of whether the contested term 
is used as a mark.76 Unlike the first element of descriptiveness, a 
defendant who fails this element cannot take advantage of the defense. 
One must determine whether consumers would view the term, as used, to 
signal source or merely to explain a product feature. Like descriptiveness, 
this element requires analysis of contextual use and may raise many 
questions of fact. 
Courts have adopted a variety of approaches to decide whether a term 
is used as a mark. Some are more helpful than others. One Court examined 
“whether the defendant is using the ‘term as a symbol to attract public 
73. Id. 
74. William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 85, n. 194
(2008) (citing Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-414, 2005 WL 3088339, 
at *20 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2005) “The first issue is whether defendant used the 
term descriptively and not as a trademark. These questions are really two sides of the same coin.”). 
75. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 953–54 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(explaining it would be inaccurate to claim that “a descriptive term can never function as a trademark. 
Such a rule would not only conflate two of the three elements of fair use, it would also be contrary to 
the well-established doctrine that a descriptive term is protectable as a trademark to the extent it has 
developed secondary meaning.”). 
76. Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 303 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting JA Apparel Corp. v.
Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 400 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
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attention.’”77 That is a bit of an odd standard because everything in an ad 
is designed to attract attention and would not likely help separate 
descriptive from source-identifying content. More helpfully, the second 
and seventh circuits have considered whether the term was used once or 
repeatedly across a series of products and services.78 
Mars tried this approach. It did not work because Smucker’s argued 
that it was using the term as a generic product name, and therefore needed 
to repeat it for different sizes and flavors. 
Repetition across multiple product types is the kind of repeated use 
that signals a term is used to communicate the source of the entire line. 
Use across multiple flavors of one product does not carry the same weight. 
It can just as easily state what a product is, and not who sells it. Mars 
offered no evidence that Smucker used “pill pouches” on a variety of 
different products. 
Use of descriptive terms in conjunction with a famous house mark 
may still constitute use as a mark. For example, when Gatorade used a 
competitor’s mark, Thirst Aid, in the slogan Gatorade is Thirst Aid, the 
Court found the use to be as a mark, notwithstanding the prominent use 
of the house mark.79 Mars did not use this decision as an analogy to make 
that point. 
There are not many clear signals that use of a phrase is not as a mark, 
but to the extent they exist, they were largely absent in this case. One clear 
indicator is when the challenged term is imbedded in other descriptive text 
and is not bolded, enlarged, or otherwise set out against surrounding 
words.80 If the words appear in a textual description similar in size and 
style to other descriptive text, a court may find that the term is less likely 
to be perceived as a mark.81 In U.S. Shoe v. Brown, the plaintiff owned 
the mark “Looks Like a Pump, Feels Like a Sneaker,” for women’s 
77. Id. at 306 (quoting JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d at 400 (2d Cir. 2009)).
78. Compare id. at 309 (holding that use across an event, a magazine and with “‘first-ever’ of 
its kind” language suggested brand use), with Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 633 
(7th Cir. 2001) (finding the Chicago Tribune did not use plaintiff’s registered mark “The Joy of Sex” 
as a mark when, after the Bulls won their sixth basketball championship, it published a newspaper 
headline proclaiming “The Joy of Six,” and printed the headline on promotional merchandise which 
included this headline and the name of the paper). 
79. Sands, 978 F.2d at 954. 
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“Use 
of a descriptive term in textual . . . instructions . . . is ordinarily a fair use.”). 
81. See U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d sub 
nom. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Defendant’s use of the words 
‘feels like a sneaker’ is not even as a caption or slogan, but as a fragment of a sentence in small print. 
In short, defendant uses the words ‘otherwise than as a trade or service mark[.]’”); Dessert Beauty, 
Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 333 (2d Cir. 2009).  
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shoes.82 The defendant ran an ad stating, “Think Of It As A Sneaker With 
No Strings Attached.”83 The ad includes the phrase, “And when we say it 
feels like a sneaker, we’re not just stringing you along.”84 Similarly, 
placing a term adjacent to larger, more prominent brand signifiers weighs 
against brand perception.85 When defending against a claim that a term 
lacks distinctiveness, failing to set off the size of one’s own mark in 
contrast to those of others may lessen the perception that the word is used 
as a mark, even if it appears in stylized text. In Frosty Treats, the Court 
noted that the use of stylized text that was similar in size to text in other 
styles did not advance the plaintiff’s claim that the descriptive term was 
perceived as a trademark.86 
When the disputed term is visually prominent, courts often find that 
such use tilts the balance towards use as a mark.87 The size and style of 
the typeface in relation to surrounding text may signal brand significance. 
It is unusual to obtain summary judgment on descriptive fair use when a 
mark is displayed as prominently as the pill pouches designation. If a word 
on a label or package is set off in a different font, on a colored background, 
and is among the largest text on a package, the visual impact generally 
signals to consumers that the words have brand meaning.88 Visual 
prominence can carry significant persuasive force. Capitalization appears 
82. U.S. Shoe Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 196. 
83. Id. at 197. 
84. Id. 
85. See Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 724 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Due to the word’s small 
size, plain color, and non-privileged placement on the bottle, we find that ‘inhibitor’ is not an 
‘attention-getting symbol,’ and does not function as a source indicator.”). 
86. See Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1004-05 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“There is no indication in the record that the survey respondents (apart from the one 
percent) were familiar with the vans because of the small nine-by-four-inch ‘Frosty Treats’ decal on 
the rear portion of the side of the van, the only place where the phrase ‘Frosty Treats’ appears on the 
vehicle. This decal, moreover, is surrounded by numerous other decals comprising the van’s menu 
board.”). 
87. See Tree Tavern Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 1263, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) 
(finding that Side Dish for One was used as a trademark, and not descriptively, based on “prominent 
positioning . . . meant to attract the consumer’s attention . . . . The phrase’s bold lettering is the largest 
on the package. It is set off from both the house mark and the generic description, and modifies the 
generic description of each individual product.”). 
88. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 938 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding the 
words Brew Nuts were used as a mark based on packaging in which the words were “much larger 
than the other lettering on the package and in a different type style. The words are set off in a 
distinctive red-brown oval, outlined in dark brown and topped by a conspicuous white circle 
containing a picture of an overflowing beer stein. Below or above the oval, depending on the particular 
package, is the phrase actually used to describe the product: ‘sweetened salted peanuts.’”). 
16
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to matter as well.89 Marks are often, but not always, capitalized. The 
absence of capitalization may signal that a term is generic or descriptive.90 
Use of a term just before a less prominent generic product name may also 
be deemed to signal source.91 It is difficult to discern why Mars did not 
rely more heavily on the prominent visual appearance of “pillpouches” on 
Smucker’s packaging. Prominent visual appearance of words in relation 
to other content on a package is often important in determining whether 
words are used as a mark.92 
The blending of two words into one can influence perception as a 
mark, especially when the term is also set off in a different and prominent 
typeface.93 The lack of a space between “pill” and “pouches” on 
Smucker’s packaging could have been used by Mars to press this point. 
Mars did not include this argument in its summary judgment motion. 
Smucker’s packaging may have led the Court to deny summary judgment. 
The words “pillpouches” appear together as one word set off from the 
surrounding text. They also appear in the center of the package where one 
expects to see a mark, and in nearly the same position where Mars “Pill 
Pockets” mark appears on its package. The similarity of the marks and 
packaging, taken with this use that could be perceived as a mark, may 
have been enough for many courts to summarily deny summary judgment 
on the ground that these facts alone would be sufficient to send the 
questions of confusion and descriptive fair use to a jury. 
Instead, Mars drew the Court’s attention to other lines in which 
Smucker prints its trademarks in a manner that is visually similar to its 
use of “pillpouches.” This strategy has been used effectively to convince 
courts to deny summary judgment in descriptive fair use cases.94 The 
argument may have been effective if Mars did not also use both generic 
89. See Adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01741-HZ, 2017 WL 3319190, 
at *24 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2017) (use of Adidas mark “SUPERNOVA” in “all caps” deemed to be a 
trademark use). 
90. See Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC, 124 U.S.P.Q.2d 1184, *6-10 
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017) (noting the “many instances in the record where the term ‘pretzel crisp’ is 
set forth in lower case” and citing this fact as indicative of a descriptive term since other brand names 
were routinely capitalized). 
91. See Beer Nuts, 711 F.2d at 938. 
92. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 124 n.6
(2004) (explaining that “the fair use analysis of KP’s employment of the stylized version of 
‘microcolor’ on its brochure may differ from that of its use of the term on the bottles and flyers”). 
93. But see, in re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding screenwipe 
generic). 
94. See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025,
1040 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a question of fact based in part on the use of Delicious in a remarkably 
similar way to how Victoria’s Secret “uses two of its own trademarks—PINK and VERY SEXY.”). 
17
Gerhardt: Fair Use Defense
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
756 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:739 
and trademark product names in a visually similar way. Mars could have 
planned ahead for that vulnerability (or tossed this argument in favor of 
one that might be more fruitful), but they did not. Smucker’s counsel did 
have a plan. They waited. This strategic decision was effective because 
instead of arguing up front that this practice was common in the industry, 
they opened the door for Mars to make much out of Smucker’s use of 
similar typeface for its registered marks and “pillpouches.” Mars’s 
counsel ran right through that door, without acknowledging that this 
practice was common in the industry and on Mars’s own products. 
Smucker’s reply brief showed that Mars itself displayed generic and 
trademarked product names in similar typeface. This evidence diffused 
Mars’s argument and did not reflect well on the credibility of its counsel. 
Use of the “TM” or “SM” symbol is perhaps the best evidence that a 
term will be understood as a mark. Courts frequently note that the absence 
of any notice and the choice not to file a trademark application may be 
viewed as evidence that the word or symbol was not intended to be used 
to designate source.95 While the presence of a trademark notice or 
application may be dispositive, the absence generally is not deemed to 
carry decisive weight. But Mars gave the Court so little to work with on 
this prong that the Court simply noted that Smucker’s did not use the 
“TM” symbol adjacent to the term “pillpouches”96 [LB1]and never 
applied to register the term as a trademark with the USPTO. The Court 
did not discuss the visual prominence of “pillpouches.” 
After noting that the company had not claimed trademark rights in 
“pillpouches,”97 the decision jumps to a discussion of the descriptive 
nature of the words without genuinely addressing whether a question of 
fact exists on whether consumers would perceive “pillpouches” as a brand 
due to its visual prominence on the package. The Court stated: 
Smucker does not have a registered trademark for Pill Pouches. Smucker 
does not use a ™ designation on its Pill Pouches label. See George & 
Co., 575 F.3d at 401 (“While not dispositive, the absence of a ™ 
designation is telling.”). Smucker’s use of the term “pill pouches” is not 
used to indicate either Smucker or Mars as the source of the product, but 
rather to describe the purpose, function, and characteristics of the 
product.98 
95. See George & Co. v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 401 (“While not dispositive, 
the absence of a ™ designation is telling.”). 
96. See Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3 (E.D. 
Va. Sept. 27, 2017). 
97. Id.
98. Id. 
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This conclusion suggests the Court did not consider whether the 
“pillpouches” could be both descriptive and perceived as a brand. 
Virtually all uses subject to this defense will be descriptive. By conceding 
that point, Mars may have been able to focus the Court’s attention more 
directly on this second prong. By failing to clarify that a term can be both 
descriptive and used as a mark, Mars missed an opportunity to overcome 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 
C. Bad Faith 
The third descriptive fair use factor precludes application of the 
defense if a defendant uses another’s mark in bad faith. In trademark law, 
a finding of bad faith requires proof that the junior user intentionally and 
unfairly tried to profit by using the plaintiff’s mark.99 For example, bad 
faith may be predicated on facts showing that a plaintiff selected a mark 
because it knew the designation would trick consumers into believing that 
its products are sourced or sponsored by someone else.100 Knowledge of 
another’s mark is not enough to establish bad faith.101 For this reason, 
actual knowledge of a senior user’s prominent use or constructive 
knowledge based on a federal trademark registration are both insufficient 
to establish bad faith.102 Similarly, continued use of a descriptive term 
after receiving a cease and desist letter will not support a finding of bad 
faith if the junior user has a strong argument that its use was not confusing 
or is protected by a trademark defense.103 Uses that may remind 
consumers of a senior user’s product are also not necessarily in bad faith 
if consumers are not likely to be confused about sponsorship, affiliation, 
or source.104 Evidence that packaging was designed to minimize the 
chance of consumer confusion can neutralize an allegation of bad faith. 
99. EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 66 (2d
Cir. 2000) (“Courts and commentators who have considered the question equate a lack of good faith 
with the subsequent user’s intent to trade on the good will of the trademark holder by creating 
confusion as to source or sponsorship.”). 
 100.  Dessert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 
333 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 101.  Person’s Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see Dessert Beauty, 
568 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (stating that mere knowledge of the plaintiff’s trademark does not equate to a 
“lack of good faith without additional evidence supporting an inference of bad faith”). 
102.  See Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 427. 
 103.  See, e.g., Wonder Labs, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 728 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (granting summary judgment for defendant on the ground that its use of “the dentists’ choice” 
was descriptive fair use, despite plaintiff’s assertion of bad faith due to failure to cease and desist use 
of its mark Dentists Choice). 
104.  See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 117 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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Therefore, use of a house mark or a visually different package design can 
demonstrate a junior user’s good faith intent to distinguish its product.105 
Mars claimed “that Smucker’s use was in bad faith due to its failure 
to cease and desist the launch of its Pill Pouches product upon receiving 
Mars’s cease and desist letter.”106 The Court correctly held that such 
knowledge of a plaintiff’s mark and infringement claim is not “sufficient 
to constitute bad faith where the terms used by both parties are 
descriptive.”107 That allegation had been found by other courts to be an 
insufficient basis to find even a question of fact. Based on that precedent 
and Smucker’s use of its house marks on different color packaging, the 
Court found that that there was not a question of fact on whether 
Smucker’s acted in bad faith.108 
Mars missed an opportunity to ffer much better evidence of bad faith. 
Here, the misdescriptive argument might have mattered. Mars could have 
asserted that Smucker’s attempted to deceive the public by choosing a 
mark nearly identical to “Pill Pockets” with words that describe Mars’s 
product but misdescribe its own product. From the beginning, Bryann 
McGann claimed that the pocket is the key to the treat’s success in the 
market. The packaging gave clear instructions to “fill,” “pinch,” and 
“give” the treat so that the pet would not taste or smell the medicine.109 
That instruction and the graphic was copied by Smucker’s as well.110 
While the Mars treat comes out of the package in the form of a pocket (or 
pouch), the Smucker’s version does not. It is a tube, open at both ends. Its 
shape does not facilitate easy hiding of the medicine from a pet, but the 
word “pouch” may deceive consumers into thinking it does. Smucker’s 
could have chosen a product name that was far less similar such as “pill 
treats” or “medicine traps.” Instead, it chose a product name that was 
nearly identical to Mars’s trademark. Mars could have argued that this 
choice raised a question of fact about whether Smucker deliberately chose 
its name to confuse consumers into thinking that “pillpouches” were part 
of the “Pill Pockets” product line. While this argument may not have been 
a silver bullet, if pressed, it may have been effective at convincing the 
105.  See Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 427-28. 
 106.  Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582, at *4 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 27, 2017). 
107.  Id. at *3-4 (citing Wonder Labs, 728 F. Supp. at 1064). 
108.  See id. 
109.  See Answer and Counterclaims at 17, Mars, Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 
2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017) (depicting the back of both Mars’s and Smucker’s 
packaging which both illustrate a “fill,” “pinch,” and “give” instruction), EFC No. 13. 
110.  See id. 
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Court that important questions of fact should have led to a denial of 
summary judgment. 
Instead, the Court noted more general attributes of the competitive 
packaging, such as the different colors and use of famous house marks.111 
Ignoring (or missing) the misdescriptive and copied elements on 
Smucker’s packaging, the Court held that it was designed to avoid tricking 
consumers into thinking the product came from any source other than its 
well-known line of dog treats.112 It pointed out that “the visual 
appearances of Smucker’s Pill Pouches label and 
Mars’s Pill Pockets mark are dissimilar; and Smucker’s product 
prominently displays the MILK–BONE name and logo to avoid consumer 
confusion as to origin.”113 One is left to wonder if the missed opportunity 
resulted from a failure to understand that knowledge from receipt of a 
cease and desist letter was not enough. Mars had better evidence of bad 
faith. While the mystery of why they did not aggressively assert it remains 
unanswered, this missed opportunity is one of the lessons from this master 
class in descriptive fair use. 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE SMUCKER’S MASTER CLASS
The first lesson from this master class can be applied at the point of 
selecting a mark for a new product. From the beginning, entrepreneurs 
should confront the foreseeable market consequences of choosing a 
descriptive mark for a new product or service. Descriptive marks are 
weak. The Lanham Act’s descriptive fair use defense guarantees 
competitors will have the right to use terms in the mark for their primary 
descriptive meaning.114 Therefore, descriptive marks can never be as 
commercially distinctive as suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful marks. 
Because of their weak quality as source identifiers, the zone of protection 
is narrow. Proving that use of an identical word is infringing will be a 
steep uphill battle. When the junior user chooses a similar descriptive 
synonym, the task may be even more difficult and not worth the fight. 
Even before conducting its fair use analysis, the Smucker’s Court noted 
Mars’s purported rights protect it only from nearly identical trademarks. 
As the United States Supreme Court held, “[i]f any confusion results, that 
is a risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its product with 
111.  See Mars, 2017 WL 4323582, at *2-3. 
112.  Id. at *3. 
113.  Id. at *2. 
114.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012); MCCARTHY, supra note 50 § 11.45. 
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a mark that uses a well-known descriptive phrase.”115 In such 
circumstances, trademarks that incorporate even minor differences—a test 
that Smucker’s readily passes—are sufficient to withstand infringement 
claims.116 
Given this precedent, entrepreneurs should prepare for the day when 
competitors enter the market. When naming a new patented product, the 
best practice is to designate a generic word for future competitors that is 
different from the mark. Had Mars done so, they might have appealed the 
District Court’s decision. But often the best defense is a strong offense. 
Smucker’s counsel responded to the lawsuit by asserting that the 
plaintiff’s “Pill Pockets” mark is perceived by consumers as a generic 
product name and should not be protected by trademark law at all.117 
Interestingly, Mars did not appeal its loss on summary judgment. Perhaps 
they knew that continued litigation would make “Pill Pockets” vulnerable 
to a challenge that the term was generic, and not protectable at all as a 
trademark. Had they preselected a generic synonym for future competitive 
use, their mark would not have been so vulnerable. It is possible that 
Smucker’s conducted a pre-litigation search of their patent and trademark 
applications for evidence of safe synonym, and chose “pill pouches” as 
their generic product name. 
Another interesting question is whether Mars’s counsel ever made a 
genuine assessment of Mars’s likelihood of success. For example, did they 
check the source of defendant’s descriptive words? Did they look to see 
if their packaging, patent, or trademark applications used a generic 
synonym, and if so whether those were the very words Mars dedicated to 
its future competitors? Did Mars conduct a survey? If they conducted a 
survey before the suit was filed, where was their evidence in the summary 
judgment proceedings? The absence of any survey evidence strongly 
suggested that Mars did a survey, and it did not help them.118 If that is so, 
why did they bring suit, and then why didn’t they settle? All trademark 
questions are ultimately decided on consumer impressions. If only the 
defendant has a survey witness, and that expert will testify that the rate of 
 115.  KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004) 
(discussing “fair use” of common terms).  
116.  See Mars, 2017 WL 4323582, at *3-4. 
 117.  See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Mars, 
Inc. v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 1:16-CV-01451, 2017 WL 4323582 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2017), EFC 
No. 25. 
118.  Mars, 2017 WL 4323582, at *2 (explaining that although survey evidence is not strictly 
necessary to prove likelihood of confusion, “the lack of such a survey can greatly hinder the plaintiff’s 
case since the plaintiff has the burden of proof”). 
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confusion is 0.0%, a defendant, as Mars learned, will not even need the 
descriptive fair use defense to succeed.  
This case also teaches future plaintiffs to make sure your competitor 
did not take its descriptive product name from your own patent or product 
packaging. If a mark owner unintentionally dedicates a generic synonym 
to its competitors in its own descriptive text, it will be hard pressed to 
show that it is asserting a claim only against unfair competition when it 
tries to prevent a competitor from using the same descriptive words.  
Perhaps the most interesting and surprising lesson for trademark 
doctrine is that use of large attractive text is not a deal-breaker for winning 
summary judgment based on the descriptive fair use defense. Because 
generic product names also may be set off to attract consumer attention, 
such use does not compel a finding that the words are used as a mark. Use 
of this practice in the industry can be especially compelling evidence to 
support this contention. If, like Smucker’s counsel, one finds such use in 
the plaintiff’s own product lines, the argument may become difficult to 
overcome. 
When I first saw the factual basis for the case, I thought summary 
judgment would be denied. That Smucker selected such a similar 
designation and featured it so prominently led me to think a descriptive 
fair use defense might fail on the second or third prong of the test. That 
didn’t happen, and when I saw the names of the lawyers at the top of the 
Court’s opinion, I was not surprised. Tim Fraelich and Angella Gott are 
superstar trademark lawyers at Jones Day in Cleveland. Their mentor, Rob 
Ducatman, is the best in the business. They are maters at trademark 
litigation, and they have an excellent, lean team that is built on trust 
through many years of working together. Their winning descriptive fair 
use strategy is a model for all future fair use litigants to study. 
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